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There are ample reasons to be wary of labeling an event an act of
"cyberterrorism." For too long the term has been employed as both a dodge
and a hustle; the former by those who minimize the importance of investing
in cybersecurity until confronted with a "cyber 9/11" and the latter by those
fear-mongering beyond all reasonable limits to obtain enormous sums of se-
curity dollars., While clearly one must watch his wallet either way when
"cyberterrorism" is invoked, what is less clear is the meaning of the term,
itself. Indeed, although coined some thirty years ago, cyberterrorism has
many definitions, which means it really has no single accepted definition.
The basics seem clear enough-use of computer networks to perpetrate harm
and incite terror-but the devil is in the details. Must the attackers have an
ideological motivation? Must non-state actors commit the act? Must the tar-
get of the harm be a civilian population? Most fundamentally, what consti-
tutes terror in an artificial world?
And so, "cyberterrorism" sputters along, loved, feared, and misunder-
stood. However, as will be explored later in this article, several recent inci-
dents suggest a developing and growing trend of what seem to be
ideologically motivated cyberattacks, intended to change the behavior of the
attack targets or society and, in some cases, cause serious damage in the
process.
The 2014 hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment (Sony) is the most noto-
rious example of this trend. From that attack, gallons of digital ink were
spilled and consequences both serious and hilarious abounded. We learned
that Channing Tatum sends emails IN ALL CAPS; at least one executive lost
her job; viewing a terrible movie briefly became a defiant political act; reams
of employee health information were made public, forming the basis of class
action litigation; and sanctions were imposed upon North Korean entities via
* The author is an attorney with AT&T in Dallas, Texas. He worked previously
for the U.S. Intelligence Community; however, the views expressed in this arti-
cle are those of the author, alone, and do not reflect the opinions or policies of
either AT&T or the U.S. Government. This article adapts and expands upon a
presentation the author gave to the Cyber-Security Symposium hosted at South-
ern Methodist Law School on October 23, 2015.
1. Compare Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 35 J. OF STRATEGIC
STUD. 5, 5 (2012) (arguing that "it is unlikely that cyber war will occur in the
future"), with RICHARD CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT
THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 103 (2010)
(Clarke speculates that a cyberattack could "disable trains ... blow up pipe-
lines . . . cause blackouts and damage electrical power grids . . . wipe out and
confuse financial records ... disrupt traffic in urban areas .. .wipe out medical
records . . .").
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Executive Order. But while these actions were undeniably "cyber," the only
official invocation of "terror" was by the hackers themselves. Perhaps that
should change.
That is the central idea of this article: not to settle the effort to define the
term "cyberterrorism" (for that work is well set by the likes of Barry Collin,2
Dorothy Denning,3 Jim Lewis4) but rather to propose a novel application of
the concepts in practice. Specifically, this article proposes a designation of
North Korea5 as a State sponsor of terrorism explicitly on the basis of its
support for the hacking of Sony, which constitutes an act of terrorism.
Section II of this article considers the elements of "cyberterrorism"
under U.S. law to find a commonality of approaches and reviews examples to
help understand the combined term. Section El summarizes the relevant facts
of the hack of Sony Pictures and applies these facts to the underpinnings of
cyberterrorism. Section IV reviews the United States' process for designating
a State as a sponsor of terrorism. Section V proposes that returning North
Korea to the State sponsors of terrorism list-relying explicitly on its in-
volvement in the Sony attack-would being to establish how "cyberterror-
ism" would actually be used in State practice and then concludes with
consideration of the effects of such action.
II. TERRORISM BY ANY OTHER NAME
A portmanteau of two of the buzziest, most abused terms in modern use,
it is instructive to look at each component piece before considering what is-
and the larger world of what is not-cyberterrorism.
2. Barry Collin, The Future of CyberTerrorism, COMPUTER CRIME RESEARCH
CENTER (last visited May 11, 2016), http://www.crime-research.org/library/
Cyberter.htm (Remarks at the 11th Annual International Symposium on Crimi-
nal Justice Issues, 1997).
3. See, e.g., Cyberterrorism: Hearing Before the Special Oversight Panel on Ter-
rorism, Committee on Armed Service, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Doro-
thy E. Denning, Georgetown University), http://www.stealth-iss.com/docu
ments/pdf/CYBERTERRORISM.pdf; Dorothy E. Denning, Is Cyber Terrorism
Coming?, THE GEORGE C. MARSHALL INSTITUTE (May 2, 2002), http://marshall
.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/DenningIs-CyberTerrorism Coming.pdf.
4. See, e.g., James A. Lewis, Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War
and Other Cyber Threats, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES (Dec. 2002),
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/021101_risks ofscyberterror.pdf.
5. Also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Korea, North,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (last visited May 11, 2016), https://www.cia
.gov/1ibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html (naming the nation's
conventional long and short form names).
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A. On Terror
Maximilien Robespierre explained, at the height of the Reign of Terror,
that "terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible."6 More
recently, a saying has emerged that "one man's terrorist is another's freedom
fighter."7 These statements offer several points central to understanding the
term "terrorism."
i. Terrorism Requires Intentional Disruption
Robespierre's backdrop was thousands of executions by guillotine. The
second quote references a freedom "fighter," not a freedom "ballot-measure
initiator." One does not simply initiate an act of terror by accident; it is calcu-
lated, intended to cause disruption.
ii. Terrorism Pits a Group Against the Society and/or the State
Although the passage of time between these two quotes captures the
historical switch from the State as perpetrator of terror to an individual or
minority group in that role, in modern times, terrorism is a tactic of asymmet-
ric warfare-how the "little guy" strikes a serious blow on the masses. Incor-
porating the above, the terrorist's activity disrupts society.8
iii. Terrorism is Ideologically Motivated
Looking to the second quote, the notion of "freedom" fighter is a
placeholder for any cause: religion, political, societal, and so forth. Financial
or even emotional causes are more likely to be considered crime than terror-
ism. The fundamental point is that the terrorist actor has a larger motivation,
and the act of terrorism is intended to further that motivation.9 Incorporating
the above, the terrorist's activity disrupts society in pursuit of the terrorist's
ideological motivation.o
6. Modern History Sourcebook: Maximilien Robespierre: Justification of the Use
of Terror, FORDHAM UNIV. (last visited May 9, 2016), http://legacy.fordham
.edu/hal sall/mod/robespierre-terror. asp.
7. See, e.g., Ronald Reagan: Radio Address to the Nation on Terrorism, THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (May 31, 1986, 12:06 PM), http://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=37376 (noting popular use of the quote).
8. See, e.g., Molly J. Hall, MD, et al., Psychological and Behavioral Impacts of
Bioterrorism, PTSD RESEARCH QUARTERLY (Fall 2002), http://www.ptsd.va
.gov/professional/newsletters/research-quarterly/v13n4.pdf (noting "the pri-
mary goal of terrorism is to disrupt society by provoking intense fear and shat-
tering all sense of personal and community safety").
9. See, e.g., TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND & U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, A
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Moving from the theoretical to the practical, there are multiple defini-
tions of "terrorism" in U.S. law alone."l Their sources include the Code of
Federal Regulations,12 the Department of Defense,13 the Federal Emergency
Management Agency,'4 and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act5 each offering
an interpretation of the term. But for instant purposes, the two most salient
definitions are those used by the Department of Justice in Title 18 and the
Department of State in Title 22.
Title 18 of the U.S. Code defines both "international terrorism" and "do-
mestic terrorism."16 The two definitions are identical but for where the under-
lying acts occur.1 7 Thus, "international terrorism" criminalizes activities that:
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation
or coercion; or
11. International law has attempted to define terrorism base on prohibition of cer-
tain activities, such as airplane hijacking or terrorist financing, versus a holistic
approach.
12. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(1) (2015) (defining terrorism as "the unlawful use of force and
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives.").
13. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., Joint Pub. 3-07.2, ANTITERRORISM
(Nov. 24, 2010), at vii, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=753152 (defining ter-
rorism as "the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and
coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, po-
litical, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are
usually political.").
14. Are You Ready? An In-Depth Guide to Citizen Preparedness, FEDERAL EMER-
GENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 148 (Aug. 1, 2004), http://www.fema.gov/me-
dia-library-data/20130726-1549-20490-0802/terrorism.pdf (defining
"terrorism" as the "use of force or violence against persons or property in vio-
lation of criminal laws of the United States for purposes of intimidation, coer-
cion, or ransom.").
15. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1)(a), 116
Stat. 2322, 2323 (2002).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2012) (notably, the definition of domestic terrorism was
added only after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, through Section
802 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001).
17. See id.
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(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruc-
tion, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of
the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which
their perpetrators operate or seek asylum;18
This definition clearly requires (1) disruptive, illegal acts such as "mass de-
struction, assassination, or kidnapping," where those involved have (2) an
intention to, or at least the appearance of an intention (3) to intimidate, co-
erce, influence, or affect the conduct of (4) either a "civilian population" or a
"government."9 These align with two of the elements mentioned above, but
Title 18, however, does not address an ideological motivation requirement,
speaking to only general mens rea of "intentional" act to intimidate, regard-
less of the actor's agenda.20
A second provision of U.S. law picks up that thread. Section 2656f of
Title 22 of the U.S. Code defines "terrorism" as "premeditated, politically
motivated violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents."21 Beyond adding an ideological motivation, this defini-
tion restricts the target set to "noncombatants" and the actors to "subnational
groups" or "clandestine agents."22 These elements of the definition serve,
principally, to distinguish acts of terrorism, committed by non-state ideo-
logues, from acts of war, reserved to state actors.23
B. On Cyber24
The most relevant treatment of "cyber" activity in U.S. law is Section
1030(a)(5); it criminalizes damage resulting from computer use. 2 5 In three
related crimes, this section addresses one who:
(A) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information,
code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intention-





21. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012).
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See generally Prosecuting Computer Crimes, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (last
visited May 11, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccman
ual.pdf.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2012).
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(B) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authori-
zation, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes dam-
age; or
(C) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authori-
zation, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage and
loss.26
When comparing the factors underlying terrorism and the elements of
Section 1030(a)(5) the most obvious commonality is that of causing disrup-
tion. This is not a surprise; both Sections 2331 and 1030(a)(5) define crimes
under U.S. law, the systemic approach for which requires elements of
mentality and activity. But Section 1030(a)(5) also shares with terrorism at
least a notion of pitting the actor against a larger group, as all three crimes
require the actor to proceed "without authorization."27 Exclusion from a
group (by denying authorization) is a means of creating the minority-major-
ity relationship. Exceeding given authorization, thus, attacks the majority
group. Examining these commonalities begins to show how "cyber" and "ter-
rorism" may be melded into a single act.
Section 1030(a)(5) does not speak to any requirement that the actor had
ideological motivations or was part of a non-state entity. It does, however,
foreshadow questions about the nature of the resulting damage. While the
crimes outlined in Section 1030(a)(5) initiate as misdemeanors, if the activity
results (or would have resulted if the activity were completed) in certain
types of damage, the crime becomes a felony.28 These damages are:
(I) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and,
for purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other pro-
ceeding brought by the United States only, loss resulting
from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other-
protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value;
(II) the modification or impairment, or potential modification
or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis,
treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals;
(ff1) physical injury to any person;
(IV) a threat to public health or safety;
(V) damage affecting a computer used by or for an entity of the
United States Government in furtherance of the administra-
tion of justice, national defense, or national security; or
26. Id.; Prosecuting Computer Crimes, supra note 24 at *24 ("Protected computer"
is defined in the CFAA, but, in practice, means any computer connected to the
Internet).
27. See id.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4).
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(VI) damage affecting 10 or more protected computers during
any 1-year period.29
Interestingly, II, m, and IV are "real world" damages, specifically to a
person's health care, to a person's body, or to public health and safety.30 But
the remaining three could conceivably manifest in only the cyber world.31
For example, the loss of $5,000 or more could result from damage to com-
puter hardware or software or the loss of intellectual property; damage to a
U.S. government computer in administration of national security could result
from taking such a computer offline through technical disablement; and dam-
age to ten or more protected computers could result from damage to hard-
ware or software or network infrastructure that denies the services of such
computers. 32 These damages would be legally sufficient, even if the affected
computers are not physically destroyed or damaged.
Pulling these underlying concepts together, one can create a joint list of
factors that underpin "cyber" and "terrorism" to include: (1) disruptive, ille-
gal acts; (2) intent to influence behavior; (3) the minority/majority relation-
ship; (4) an ideological motivation; (5) restriction to sub-national actors; and
(6) the possibility that damage not manifest physically in the real world.
C. On Cyberterrorism
It is the last of these factors, the possibility that damage may not mani-
fest physically, that has proven the most divisive because the ability to cause
sufficiently terroristic effect without damage in the physical world is a rela-
tively recent development. Consider the statement of Professor Dorothy Den-
ning to define "cyberterrorism" in 2000:
Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. It
is generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats of
attack against computers, networks, and the information stored
therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its peo-
ple in furtherance of political or social objectives. Further, to qual-
ify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence against
persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate
fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, plane
crashes, water contamination, or severe economic loss would be
examples. Serious attacks against critical infrastructures could be
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disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance
would not.33
Professor Denning's statement was, and remains, a leading definition of
cyberterrorism. However, it was an opinion rendered in 2000 when the tech-
nological landscape was quite different.34 1n such a context, one could hardly
imagine the value of assets that exist entirely outside the real world and the
destructive, even terroristic value of their deprivation or removal. But in the
modern world where whole communities and businesses, such as Facebook
or cloud storage providers, have untold riches in intellectual property and
electronic documents that exist solely online, it becomes more conceivable to
have a terrorist act that does not have any manifestation in the real world.35 A
definition ascribed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) comes clos-
est to envisioning non-physical damage.36 Mirroring Title 22, Section 2656f,
this definition posits "cyberterrorism" as "premeditated, politically motivated
attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data
which results in violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national
groups or clandestine agents."37
To test these factors as underlying cyberterrorism, consider three exam-
ples of recent cyber events to determine whether they are "cyberterrorism" or
another kind of cyber activity:
1. In 2007, "cyberterrorists" hacked the power grid, air traffic control,
broadcast media, the stock market, elevator shafts, telecommunica-
tions networks, and other targets. 38 If you somehow missed all of
33. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(1) (2015) (defining terrorism as "the unlawful use of force
and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government,
the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or
social objectives.").
34. See id.
35. However, Harold Koh, then State Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department,
commented that a cyber activity "would likely be viewed as a use of force,"
pursuant to Article 2.4 of the UN Charter, where the activities "proximately
result in death, injury, or significant destruction." Significantly, Koh did not
claim such real world damage is a per se necessary factor and the consideration
for "use of force" should merit a higher threshold; nor was Koh specifically
addressing U.S. law or terrorism. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser to the U.S. State
Dep't, "International Law in Cyberspace" at USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency
Legal Conference, (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/
197924.htm.
36. See Sue Marquette Poremba, Cyber Terrorist Threats Loom 10 Years After 9/
11, NBCNEWS (Sept. 6, 2011, 5:40 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/444151
09/ns/technology-and-science-security/t/cyber-terrorist-threats-loom-years-af
ter/#.Vr6S5FLd6G9.
37. See id. (emphasis added); see also 22 U.S.C § 2656f.
38. Live Free or Die Hard (20th Century Fox 2007).
2vorth Korea - State Sponsor of CyberTerrortsm 71
this, it is the plot to "Live Free or Die Hard," in which Bruce Willis
manages to stop this cyberattack by shooting It.39 But Hollywood is
often an early adopter of our worst fears. Although the "terrorist"
professes an ideological motivation-namely showing the world that
reliance on technology makes us massively vulnerable to malicious
actors-he is, at the end of the day, actually looking to steal billions
of dollars.40 While some would say greed is an ideological motiva-
tion, the law would more readily categorize these events as cyber-
crime rather than true cyberterrorism, as addressed under Title 18,
Section 1030.41
2. In 2008, tensions flared in the South Ossetia region of Georgia, bor-
dering Russia.42 In advance of an actual shooting war, cyber actors
hit a number of websites of the Georgian Government with distrib-
uted denial of service (DDOS) attacks and defacement campaigns.43
The targets included the website of the Georgian President Mikhail
Saakashvili, of whom several pictures were set in comparison to sim-
ilar images of Adolph Hitler.44 While certainly a cyber activity with
ideological motivations-given the larger context of the brewing
military conflict and the hackers' likely association, or at least align-
ment, with, the Russian Government-the activity against Georgia
would more likely be categorized an act of war. In this case, the
activity was akin to propaganda or psychological operations to un-
dermine the enemy's will to fight, thus falling outside the limitations
of Title 22, Section 2656f.45
3. Recent years have witnessed the growth of the self-proclaimed Is-
lamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and particularly its savvy ex-
ploitation of social media.46 In addition to a claimed hack of U.S.
Central Command's Facebook page, the group has Twitter feeds, an
encrypted chat app, and makes frequent and often gruesome use of
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).




45. See 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012).
46. Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Sees Failure in Fighting ISIS on Social Media, N.Y.
TIMES (June 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/world/middleeast/
isis-is-winning-message-war-us-concludes.html.
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YouTube.47 An argument could be made that YouTube videos of
beheadings are intended to intimidate the public into changing pol-
icy; however, if these activities principally aim to inspire others to
join ISIS, to take up the cause individually, to fundraise, or to com-
municate, both to members or to the world, such activities would be
considered adversarial use of the internet, but not true cyberterrorism
pursuant to either Sections 2331 and 1030.48
However, two recent examples that more likely would be considered
cyberterrorism:
1. In 2008, the hackers of Anonymous and 4Chan started a harassment
campaign against the Church of Scientology in response to percep-
tions that the Church was attempting to censor or restrict embarrass-
ing information online.49 The tools used in what has come be known
as "Chanology" were both cyber and real world, including DDOS
attacks and black faxes, as well as sit-ins and petitioning the IRS for
investigation.50 There was clearly ideological motivation; Anony-
mous believes, unrelentingly, that all information should be free for
all.51 The attacks were intended to force a group-the Church of
Scientology-to change its behavior, and the modus operandi was
cyber-enabled.52
2. 2015 saw the release of accounts registered on Ashley Madison, a
website that catered to (almost exclusively) married men seeking to
have affairs.53 A group calling itself the "Impact Team" hacked the
servers of Ashley Madison's parent company and then attempted to
blackmail the company into shutting down on belief that the com-
pany was trading in sin.54 When the company did not comply, the
Impact Team released the information.55 This attack was clearly
ideologically motivated and clearly accomplished via cyber means,
but even more so than Chanology, pushed the limits of "damage."
47. Id.; Josh Constine, ISIS Has Its Own Encrypted Chat App, TECHCRUNCH (Jan.
16, 2016), http://techcrunch.com/2016/01/16/isis-app/.
48. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 2331 (2012).
49. PARMY OLSON, WE ARE ANONYMOUS: INSIDE THE HACKER WORLD OF LULZ-
SEC, ANONYMOUS, AND THE GLOBAL CYBER INSURGENCY 62 (2013) (2012).
50. Id. at 71.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Robert Hackett, What to Know About the Ashley Madison Hack, FORTUNE
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Which brings us to the biggest recent example, the 2014 hack of Sony Pic-
tures Entertainment.
HI. MAKING JAMES FRANCO A CHAMPION
OF FREE SPEECH
On November 24, 2014, the world became aware of what Sony56 had
known for some time: there was a major hack.57 That morning, Sony employ-
ees booted computers to an image of a red skeleton and the banner announce-
ment "Hacked by GOP."58 The group claiming responsibility, the Guardians
of Peace, threatened to release a claimed 100 terabytes of Sony's internal
data, including unreleased draft scripts of full-length films, movie star salary
information, internal emails, and personal information, including health in-
formation of Sony employees.59 When Sony balked, the Guardians of Peace
56. Sony Pictures Entertainment is based in Culver City, California, and is a sub-
sidiary of Sony Entertainment Inc., in turn a subsidiary of Sony Corporation of
Tokyo, Japan. About Sony Pictures, SONYPICTURES.COM (last visited May 11,
2016), http://www.sonypictures.com/corp/aboutsonypictures.htm.
57. See generally Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures Hack, Explained, WASH.
PosT (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
2014/12/18/the-sony-pictures-hack-explained/; Mark Seal, An Exclusive Look
at Sony's Hacking Saga, VANrrY FAIR (Mar. 2015), http://www.vanityfair.com/
hollywood/2015/02/sony-hacking-seth-rogen-evan-goldberg; Lori Grisham,
Timeline: North Korea and the Sony Pictures Hack, USA TODAY (Jan. 5,
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/12/18/sony-
hack-timeline-interview-north-korea/20601645/; Elyse Betters, Sony Pictures
Hack: Here's Everything We Know About the Massive Attack So Far, POCKET
LINT (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.pocket-lint.com/news/131937-sony-pictures-
hack-here-s-everything-we-know-about-the-massive-attack-so-far; Steve
Ragan, Hackers Suggest They Had Physical Access During Attack on Sony
Pictures, CSO (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2851649/
physical-security/hackers-suggest-they-had-physical-access-during-attack-on-
sony-pictures.html; Julie Bort, How the Hackers Broke Into Sony and Why it
Could Happen to Any Company, Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www
.businessinsider.com/how-the-hackers-broke-into-sony-2014-12; Kim Zetter,
Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Don't Know So Far, WIRED (Dec.
3, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know/.
58. Peterson, supra note 57; Seal, supra note57; Grisham, supra note 57; Betters,
supra note 57; Ragan, supra note 57; Bort, supra note 57; Zetter, supra note
57.
59. Peterson, supra note 57; Seal, supra note 57; Grisham, supra note 57; Betters,
supra note 57; Ragan, supra note 57; Bort, supra note 57; Zetter, supra note
57.
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followed through on the threat-they released the data and then erased and
deleted Sony's network.60
Almost immediately suspicion fell on North Korea. Sony was set to re-
lease "The Interview," a comedy in which James Franco and Seth Rogan
operate a television news program that is invited to interview North Korea's
leader, Kim Jung-Un, only to be asked by the Central Intelligence Agency to
assassinate Kim.61 Understandably, North Korea was upset about this plot
and had asked both the U.S. Government and the United Nations to prevent
the release.62 When those requests failed, the thinking went, North Korea
took action into its own hands.63And it worked! After "The Interview"
premiered in Los Angeles, the Guardians of Peace released a statement on
December 16, specifically targeting "The Interview":
Warning. We will clearly show it to you at the very time and
places "The Interview" be shown, including the premiere, how
bitter fate those who seek fun in terror should be doomed to. Soon
all the world will see what an awful movie Sony Pictures En-
tertainment has made. The world will be full of fear. Remember
the 11th of September 2001. We recommend you to keep yourself
distant from the places at that time. (If your house is nearby, you'd
better leave.) Whatever comes in the coming days is called by the
greed of Sony Pictures Entertainment. All the world will denounce
the SONY.64
Although the Department of Homeland Security represented that it was
aware of no credible threats of this nature, Sony complied, halting the na-
tional release of "The Interview." 65 The reaction was swift and negative.
President Obama said Sony had made a "mistake," a sentiment echoed by
60. Peterson, supra note 57; Seal, supra note 57; Grisham, supra note 57; Betters,
supra note 57; Ragan, supra note 57; Bort, supra note 57; Zetter, supra note
57.
61. The Interview (Columbia Pictures, 2014); Peterson, supra note 57; Seal, supra
note 57; Grisham, supra note 57; Betters, supra note 57; Ragan, supra note 57;
Bort, supra note 57; Zetter, supra note 57.
62. Ben Beaumont-Thomas, North Korea Complaints to UN About Seth Rogen
Comedy The Interview, THE GUARDIAN (July 10, 2014), http://www.theguar-
dian.com/film/2014/jul/10/north-korea-un-the-interview-seth-rogen-james-
franco.
63. David Gilbert, FBI Claim that North Korea Hacked Sony Pictures Bolstered by
NSA Evidence, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/
fbi-claim-that-north-korea-hacked-sony-pictures-bolstered-by-nsa-evidence- 14
88783
64. See, e.g., Seal, supra note 57.
65. Grisham, supra note 57.
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free speech advocates.66 The lone corner of praise for the decision came from
North Korea.67 Although denying any involvement, North Korean state tele-
vision had called the hack a "righteous deed."68 The FBI had been on the
case for weeks and, on December 19th, 2014, publicly attributed the attack
on Sony to North Korean actors.69 The FBI based its conclusion on a techni-
cal analysis of the deletion malware, the "significant overlap" with previous
malicious cyber activity linked to North Korea, and the "similarities" be-
tween the tools used against Sony and attacks North Korea had conducted
against South Korean banks.70 Sony reversed course and set "The Interview"
for limited a Christmas Day release. The world rejoiced.
Briefly, seeing "The Interview" was a political act; "The Interview"
earned about $36 million in initial release (although it cost about $77 million
to make).7' The larger fallout for Sony, however, was still to come. Sony
settled a lawsuit with the employees whose information was hacked for an
estimated $8 million.72 Additional lawsuits are pending.73 Sony estimated its
66. Evan Perez et al., Obama: Sony 'Made a Mistake', CNN (Dec. 19, 2014), http:/
/www.cnn.com/2014/12/19/politics/fbi-north-korea-responsible-sony/ ("We
cannot have a society in which some dictators someplace can start imposing
censorship here in the United States because if somebody is able to intimidate
us out of releasing a satirical movie, imagine what they start doing once they
see a documentary that they don't like or news reports they don't like.").
67. Assoc. Press in Seoul, North Korea: Sony hack a righteous deed but we didn't
do it, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
dec/07/north-korea-sony-hack-a-righteous-deed-but-we-didnt-do-it.
68. Id.
69. See David Gilbert, supra note 63.
70. Press Release, FBI, Update on Sony Investigation (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www
.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation; Alex Hem,
FBI Doubles Down on North Korea Accusation for Sony Pictures Hack, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/
08/fbi-north-korea-accusation-sony-pictures-hack.
71. This amount includes a record $31 million in video-on-demand sales (surely
inflated by the controversy); however, the box office estimates were at just a $5
million gross (surely deflated by the limited release). See, e.g., Ryan
Faughnder, 'The Interview' Earns $31 Million from VOD, $5 Million at Box
Office, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.latimes.comlentertainment/en-
velope/cotown/la-et-ct-sonys-the-interview-vod-box-office-20150106-story
.html.
72. Press Release, Sony Pictures, Message for Current and Former Sony Pictures
Employees and Dependents, and for Production Employees (Dec. 15, 2014) (on
file with author); Seung Lee, Sony Agrees to Settle Hacking Lawsuit for $8
Million: Report, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20, 2015, http://mmc-news.comlnews-sony-
agrees-to-settle-hacking-lawsuit-for-8-million-report-278671.dbv.
2015] 417
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
damaged IT infrastructure will cost $35 million to rebuild.74 Lost intellectual
property only adds to the cost. In all, the damage is surely in the hundreds of
millions of dollars.75
But for the purposes of this article, the attack was (1) unlawful and
disruptive, if not "violent" in the physical sense; (2) clearly intended to influ-
ence Sony and the general public against "The Interview"; (3) perpetrated by
a minority group (in the sense that North Korea is on the outside of the civil
world community) seeking imposition of its will against the majority; (4)
motivated by a political and social ideology; (5) attributed to North Korean
actors of indeterminate position; and (6) principally inflicted in the cyber
world, but had real world monetary and hardware consequences, as well as
real world damages to the Sony employees. This is what cyberterrorism
looks like.
IV. THE BUREAUCRATIC ART OF CALLING IT LIKE IT IS
Seeking to not just play whack-a-mole with individual terrorists and ter-
rorist groups, but rather to take a comprehensive approach of cutting off ter-
rorists' support networks, the U.S. Government has a system for designating
"State sponsors of terrorism" and imposing sanctions upon such States to
persuade them to abandon these pursuits.76
Because nothing with this topic is ever clear-cut, there are actually three
sources of law by which the United States may designate a foreign state as a
73. Eric Gardner, Sony Pictures Taps Daniel Floyd to Oversee Litigation,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/
thr-esq/sony-pictures-taps-daniel-floyd-859176.
74. Kim Zetter, Evidence Suggests the Sony Hackers Are Alive and Well and Still
Hacking, WIRED (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/02/evidence-sug
gests-the-sony-hackers-are-alive-and-well-and-still-hacking/.
75. Not to equivocate human life to a movie script, but from a purely economic
standpoint, the "cost" of the Sony hack will likely exceed that of the 7/7/05
attacks in London and possibly the 2008 Mumbai Hotel attacks.
76. See generally DIANNE RENNACK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43835, STATE
SPONSORS OF Acrs OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - LEGISLATIVE PARAME-
TERS: IN BRIEF (2015); MARK SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL32251,
CUBA AND THE STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM LIST (2005); U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
2008: CH. 3 - STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM OVERVIEW (2009); U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
2013: CH. 3 - STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM OVERVEW (2014); Dennis Jett,
Why the State Sponsors of Terrorism List Has So Little To Do With Terrorism,
THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/den-
nis-jett/state-sponsors-of-terrorism-list b_7658880.html; Krishnadev Calamur,
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sponsor of terrorism: the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; the Arms Control
Export Act; and the Export Administration Act of 1979.77 Each of these acts
have been amended many times since their enactment, so much so that not
one of them even included "anything that would constitute construction of a
list" of State sponsors in the initial iteration.78 As further evidence that "State
sponsor" designation is somewhat ad hoc, the Export Administration Act of
1979 has technically expired, but has been sustained through Executive
action.79
Finally, although the three sources use a common standard-that the
U.S. Government may designate a State as a sponsor of terrorism if it has
"repeatedly provided support to international terrorism"-not one of the
sources define the central term "international terrorism."80 Two of the
sources offer some color commentary or examples of representative acts that
could constitute "international terrorism." The Arms Export Control Act ref-
erences that the term includes activities that:
[W]illfully aid or abet the international proliferation of nuclear ex-
plosive devices to individuals or groups, willfully aid or abet an
individual or group in acquiring unsafeguarded special nuclear
material, or willingly aid or abet the efforts of an individual or
group to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.81
Likewise, the Export Administration Act offers that the standard to determine
whether one "repeatedly provide[s] support for acts of international terror-
ism" includes "the recurring use of any part of the territory of the country as
a sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist organizations."82
Perhaps the most direct reference to a definition of terrorism comes
from a related cross-reference. Congress requires an annual report on foreign
countries that support international terrorism, which includes a discussion of
designating them as a State sponsor of terrorism.83 What is the basis for this
report, and thus the determining factor of the definition of "terrorism"? The
Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, which
use the earlier discussed definition of terrorism to mean "premeditated, polit-
77. RENNACK, supra note 76, at 2.
78. Id. at 5.
79. Authority is maintained by the National Emergencies Act and the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, implemented through Executive Orders,
most recently E.O. 13,222 of August 17, 2001. Id. at 2.
80. Id. at 2-3.
81. 22 U.S.C. § 2780(d) (2012); id. at 3.
82. RENNACK, supra note 76, at 3.
83. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f (2012).
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ically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subna-
tional groups or clandestine agents."84
The point is that designation of a State as a sponsor of terrorism is more
art than science; more politics than law. Designations are "determined" by
the Secretary of State, but it is a whole-of-government process. 85 For all of
the ambiguity in the designation of State sponsors of terrorism, what is clear
once a designation is announced are the ramifications directed upon the des-
ignated States. A designated State is limited or prohibited from many types
of U.S. aid, or trade in, a designated state.86 Specifically, under the amended
Export Administration Act of 1979, the Secretary of State may limit the pub-
lic and private export of technology or goods, including defense articles, to
designated States for national security or foreign policy reasons.87 Addition-
ally, the amended Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires the United States
to oppose any financial assistance to designated States given by international
financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the Export-Import Bank, and
the International Monetary Fund.88 To show it is serious, the United States
even prohibits Peace Corp volunteers from serving in designated States and
the United States denies the bounty of tax-free shopping to citizens of desig-
nated States.89
To again seek clarity from examples, the official list of States desig-
nated sponsors of terrorism has existed since 1979. Eight States have ap-
peared on the list,90 but only three are now included: Syria, Iran, and Sudan.91
Syria, the only remaining charter member, is a known supporter of Hammas,
has historically carried out numerous bombing campaigns abroad and domes-
tically, and had conducted politically motivated assassinations.92 And that is
all before the recent ruthless suppression of rebellion and the use of chemical
weapons within its own territory, against their own citizens. 93
Iran has been on the list since 1984, somehow avoiding listing during
the hostage crisis. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp both supports and
84. Id.
85. U.S. State Dep't, State Sponsors of Terrorism, STATE.GOV, http://www.state
.gov/j/ct/list/cl4l5l.htm (last visited May 11, 2016).




90. Id. at 7 (discussing Syria, Iran, and Sudan as current members; Cuba and North
Korea as recently removed members, and Libya (1979-2006), South Yemen
(1979-1990), and Iraq (1979-1982 and 1990-2003) as previously removed
members).
91. COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 2013, supra note 76.
92. Id. at 287-88.
93. Id. at 288.
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commits acts of terrorism.94 Iran is a major supporter of Hizballah (aka
Hezbollah), has harbored known al Qaeda suspects, and has sought to de-
velop both chemical and nuclear weapons, as well as proliferated technology
thereof.95
Probably the most interesting current inclusion as a State sponsor of
terrorism is Sudan, which is described in the Department of State's annual
report as being a "generally cooperative partner of the United States on
counterterrorism."96 However, because Sudan allows both al Qaeda and the
Lord's Resistance Army to live and operate within its borders, it has been
designated as a State sponsor of terrorism.97 Again, art, not science.
Also of interest, neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan has ever been desig-
nated a State sponsor of terrorism, despite the presence of the Taliban and al
Qaeda in the former, and the admission, by former President Asif Ali Zadari,
that Pakistan had deliberately "created and nurtured" terrorist groups as a
matter of State policy.98
Finally, it is instructive to look at the two States that were most recently
removed from the list. Within the last year, Cuba was removed from the
list.99 Cuba was added to the list in 1982100 and remained until 2015,101 de-
spite a lack of any recent evidence of support for terrorism (and an open
acknowledgement of that fact). But political realities required Cuba remain
on the list, until, suddenly, the realities no longer required the State's inclu-
sion, and Cuba was removed from the list as part of an initial normalization
of relations.102
The State removed most recently prior to Cuba was North Korea. 103 Just
six years after being identified in President Bush's 2002 State of the Union
address as a member of the "axis of evil,"104 the political tide turned and
94. Id. at 285.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 286.
97. COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 2013, supra note 76, at 286.
98. Dean Nelson, Pakistani President Asif Zadari Admits Creating Terrorist
Groups, THE TELEGRAPH (July 8, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asialpakistan/5779916/Pakistani-president-Asif-Zardari-admits-cre
ating-terrorist-groups.html.




103. See MARK E. MANYIN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43865, NORTH Ko-
REA: BACK ON THE STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM LISTS? 4 (2015).
104. George W. Bush, President, State of the Union Address Before a Joint Session
of Congress (Jan. 29, 2002).
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global expediency, again, required the removal of North Korea from the State
sponsors list.105 This removal was a condition for the "Six Party Talks" that
sought resolution of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
program.1 06
However, North Korea had initially and continually been designated a
State sponsor per a rather convincing case. Prior to North Korea's removal
from the list, in considering legislative action against North Korea, the U.S.
Senate had compiled a rather damming list of practices North Korea would
have to address, including "weapons proliferation, harboring terrorists, coun-
terfeiting U.S. currency, trafficking in narcotics, abduction of citizens of Ja-
pan and South Korea, and resolution of outstanding South Korean prisoner-
of-war questions remaining from the 1950s conflict."107 Even this summary
omits earlier actions of North Korea to conduct or support terrorism, includ-
ing the in-flight bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 in 1987 that killed 115
passengers (the principal event that caused North Korea to be added to the
list in 1987).108
Since the 2008 removal from the State sponsors list, North Korea has
been implicated in additional activities counter to peace and order, including
the:
* March 2010 sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean naval vessel,
killing forty-six sailors;109
* November 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South
Koreans and wounding eighteen more;I 0
* weapons and material proliferation activities directed toward Iran,
Syria, and Libya; I'
105. See MANYIN ET AL., supra note 103, at 4.
106. Id.
107. RENNACK, supra note 76, at 7; id. (Senator Sam Brownback said "A resolution
expressing the sense of the Senate that certain benchmarks must be met before
certain restrictions against the Government of North Korea are lifted, and that
the United States Government should not provide any financial assistance to
North Korea until the Secretary of State makes certain certifications regarding
the submission of applications for refugee status.").
108. MANYIN ET AL., supra note 103, at 4.
109. Brad Lendon, S. Korea's Final Report Affirms Cheonan Was Sunk by N.Korean
Torpedo, CNN (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/
09/13/south.korea.cheonan.report.
110. Mark McDonald, 'Crisis Status' in South Korea After North Shells Island, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/worldlasia/24ko-
rea.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
111. See PAUL K. KERR ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43480, IRAN-NORTH Ko-
REA-SYRIA BALLISTIC MISSILE AND NUCLEAR COOPERATION, 1, 4, 6-8 (2015).
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* ties to Hizbollah and Hammas, including providing weapons and lo-
gistics support;"l 2
* continuing kidnappings and assassinations of North Korean refugees,
critics, and foreigners abroad;113 and
* continuing development of WMD programs, including a submarine-
launched ballistic missile capabilityll4 and possible preparations for a
fourth nuclear bomb test.' '
Although some of these acts could be classified as acts of war and not terror-
ism, North Korea still seems to be involved with more than enough terroristic
acts and actors to be listed on the State sponsors of terrorism list, even before
considering the Sony hack.
V. I (TRY TO) KNOW WHO YOU ARE, BUT WHAT AM I?
So we come to the main idea of this article, that the Secretary of State
must return North Korea to the U.S. State sponsors of terrorism list, and the
designation should be explicitly and centrally tied to North Korea's hack into
Sony.]16 The hack clearly falls within the definitions of terrorism under U.S.
law, specifically as codified at 22 U.S.C. 2565f, the standard for designations
to the State sponsors list.' '7
112. See Andrea Berger, North Korea, Hamas, and Hezbollah: Arm in Arm?, 38
NORTH (Aug. 5, 2014), http://38north.org/2014/08/aberger)80514; see also
Chang Jae-soon, U.S. Court Finds N. Korea Liable for Supporting Rocket At-
tacks on Israel, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY (June 24, 2014, 8:07 AM), http://en-
glish.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/07/24/39/0401000000AEN20140724
000351315F.html.
113. See, e.g., HEADQUARTERS FOR THE ABDUCTION ISSUE, Gov'T OF JAPAN, Abduc-
tions of Japanese Citizens by North Korea (last visited May 11, 2016), http://
www.rachi.go.jp/en/index.html.
114. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., North Korea: Development of Submarine-Launched
Ballistic Missile Continues, 38 NORTH (Oct. 14, 2015), http://38north.org/2015/
10/jbermudezl01415.
115. Alastair Gale, North Korea May Have Taken Steps for New Nuclear Bomb
Test, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-
may-have-taken-steps-for-new-nuclear-bomb-test-1445341415.
116. Such designation would explicitly and centrally rely on the Sony hack but,
obviously, would also reference the many other acts of terrorism that North
Korea has supported. But see Micah Zenko, Sorry, But North Korea Isn't a
State Sponsor of Terrorism, FOREIGN POLICY (Dec. 22, 2014), http://foreignpoli
cy.com/2014/12/22/sorry-but-north-korea-isnt-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-
cuba-unacceptables-list.
117. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2); see generally MANYIN ET AL., supra note 103; REN-
NACK, supra note 76; David Auerbach, The Sony Hackers are Terrorists,
SLATE (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/bitwise/2014/
12/sony-pictures hack why-its-perpetrators should becalledcyberterrorists
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Perhaps hardline deniers of "cyberterrorism" would reject the idea that
the Sony hack resulted in real-world damage, harkening back to traditional
notions that someone must die or something must explode to constitute true
terrorism. Again, of course, there is an inherent fundamental difference be-
tween the loss of intellectual property or privacy interests and loss of human
lives. But the majority of terrorist acts directly impact only a limited number
of people; the "terroristic" effect is, in many cases, caused by generating
sympathy for the victims and fear of the seemingly random imposition of
violence.
However, limiting the scope of terrorism to only those acts with real
world damage negates two major points that demonstrate the "terroristic"
effects of cyberterrorism. First, such a limitation denies modem reality,
where real, monetary damage can be affected through simple manipulation of
ones and zeros as surely as through placement of explosives. Second,
cyberterrorism, as with all things cyber, greatly increases both the velocity
and the scope of possible damage. We are all digitally connected and, thus,
all targets can and could be attacked at the same time. Most fundamentally,
the real world example of Sony's decision to withdraw release of "The Inter-
view," even if temporarily, demonstrates cyberterrorists may still achieve
their goals without causing real-world harm. It is time to start drawing lines
as to what is, and is not, acceptable State practice in cyberspace.
Some might astutely point out that the impact of a designation of North
Korea would be minimal, as they are already subject to major sanctions and
restrictions through other sources of law, such as implementation of United
Nations resolutions against North Korea.'t8 However, the 2008 removal from
the State sponsors list did not bring an opening of relations or trade between
the United States and North Korea; then, as now, the restrictions were in
place for reasons that removing State sponsorship did not negate.1 9 No, in
2008, as it would again now, the principal reason for the designation is the
negative political effect of affirmatively labeling North Korea a terrorist
state. 120
North Korea has proven to be intensely aware of its geopolitical reputa-
tion. Indeed, removal from the State sponsors list was a diplomatic and polit-
.html; Jacob Kastrenakes, Sony Hackers Threaten Terror Attacks Against Peo-
ple Who See The Interview in Theaters, THE VERGE (Dec. 16, 2014), http://
www.theverge.com/2014/12/16/7402649/sony-hackers-threaten-terror-attacks-
on-people-seeing-the-interview.
118. See Exec. Order No. 13,687, 80 Fed. Reg. 819 (Jan. 6, 2015) ("Imposing Addi-
tional Sanctions with Respect to North Korea," the third Order issued against
North Korea during President Obama's Administration); see also S.C. Res.
2094, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2094 (Mar. 7, 2013); S.C. Res. 2087, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/2087 (Jan. 22, 2013); S.C Res. 1874, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12,
2009); S.C Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006).
119. MANYIN ET AL., supra note 103, at 3.
120. See id. at 4.
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ical victory for North Korea.'12 Even within the police state of North Korea,
where the government controls access to the media, a new designation as a
State sponsor could have profound political impact on the regime, domesti-
cally and internationally.
Another concrete benefit of designation, not yet herein discussed, is that
it nullifies provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Actl22 such that
the designated State is subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. court system and
private actions brought therein.123 The principle of foreign sovereign immu-
nity has existed in the United States for more than 200 years.1 24 Since its
codification in 1976, foreign sovereign immunity has been invoked to at-
tempt to quash a number of high-profile litigation efforts, such as those
brought by survivors of the 9/11 attacks and victims of abuse by Catholic
clerics.125 In cases where the defendants are fully stripped of immunity and
the litigation proceeds to verdict, the monetary awards can be sizeable: $8
million for survivors and family of victims of the U.S.S. Cole bombing;126 a
settlement of up to $10 million per family for the 259 victims of the Pan Am
Flight 103 bombing;127 $300 million for families of an assassinated rabbi;128
and $300 million for kidnappings of American citizens.129 Obviously, not all
121. Helene Cooper, U.S. Declares North Korea Off Terror List, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/world/asiall3terror.html?_r-0.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008); see Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330, 1332 1391(f), 1441(d), and 1602-1611 (2015)).
123. See DAVID P. STEWART, THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES AcT: A GUIDE
FOR JUDGES 71-72 (2013), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/Discovery-in-Intemational-Civil-Litigation.pdf/$file/Discovery-in-In-
temational-Civil-Litigation.pdf; Scott A. Gilmore, Suing the Surveillance
States: the (Cyber) Tort Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 46
COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 227, 233-34 (2015); Chad Marzen, Liability for
Terrorism in American Courts: Aiding-and-Abetting Liability Under FSIA
State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception and the Alien Tort Statute, 25 T.M. Coo-
LEY L. REV. 503, 504 (2008).
124. See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 116-17 (1812).
125. Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. 116; In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,
538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated by Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305,
311 (2010); Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2009).
126. See Rux v. Sudan, 461 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2006); Stephen Smith, Sudan Or-
dered to Pay USS Cole Families $8M, CBS NEWS (July 25, 2007), http://www
.cbsnews.com/news/sudan-ordered-to-pay-uss-cole-families-8m/.
127. See Anthony J. Sebok, Libya, Lockerbie, and the Long-Delayed Settlement Re-
lating to Pan Am Flight 103, FINDLAW (Sept. 08, 2003), http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20030908.html.
128. Acosta v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 15, 31 (D.D.C. 2008).
129. Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp. 2d 216, 233 (D.D.C. 2012).
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filed suits make it to judgment, and an even smaller percentage of judgments
awarded are actually collected. But, as in the case with Libya and the Pan
Am 103 bombing, settlement of such claims can be a concrete step toward
reestablishing normalized relationships with the world community.30
The Sony hack has already resulted in at least one class action lawsuit
by the employees of Sony.131 While Sony settled the suit, it would, without a
doubt, be interested in pursuing legal recourse against North Korea as the
party ultimately responsible for the problem.132 Of course, it is unclear if
Sony would prevail in court and unlikely that North Korea would appear and
much less likely they would ever be made to pay an adverse judgment. But it
would, if successful, be on the books as an issue needing resolution, should
relations between the United States and North Korea ever improve.
It is important not to underestimate the value of this provision of the
State sponsor designation process. Because data breaches are rarely crimi-
nally prosecuted, the majority of litigation is in a civil context to recover
damages, by the affected parties. These suits easily reach the tens of millions
of dollars.133 Where such suit could be based on an act of terrorism supported
by a foreign State, one has to imagine that the damaged U.S. company would
love to divert costs toward the designated State.
As stated, this is a proposal in favor of making something of "cyberter-
rorism," and not an effort to categorically define the phenomenon or prove
that it exists. And a move to designate States as sponsors of terrorism based
upon or reliant upon cyber activity would not be without its problems. The
great white whale of cyber response continues to be attribution. While a cen-
tral point of terrorism is the perpetrator's desire to link the act to his message,
the point of designating State sponsors is that the sponsorship model allows
the State to see a terroristic goal accomplished while the State is able to
maintain plausible deniability of involvement. The FBI was quick and con-
clusive in blaming North Korean actors for the Sony hack, however, not all
parties were convinced.134 One could imagine that with either a more sophis-
130. See Sebok, supra note 127.
131. Alexandra Burlacu, Sony Pictures Entertainment Settles in Ex-Employees'




133. Robert Sumner, IV & Mindy Vervais, The Typical Data Breach Lawsuit and
How to Protect Your Company, INSIDE COUNSEL (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www
.insidecounsel.com/2014/10/01/the-typical-data-breach-lawsuit-and-how-to-
protect.
134. Amanda Hess, Inside the Sony Hack, SLATE (Nov. 22, 2015), http://www.slate
.com/articles/technology/users/2015/1 1/sony-employees-on the hackone_
year_1ater.html.
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ticated attack or actor, the breadcrumbs might be even harder to identify and
conclusively ascribe to a specific foreign State.
Alternatively, States that would proceed with terrorism may already be
subject to enough restrictions (like North Korea) such that designation might
be ineffective. First, the sanctions and restrictions that accompany State spon-
sor designation may be effectively redundant in application to a State, due to
previous sanctions or restrictions. Second, a State may not be affected by
"soft power" measures such as global perception or the risk of jurisdiction to
U.S. legal judgments. As a result, designation would be a largely toothless
measure, at very least in the sense that it is rarely a predicate consideration to
more direct or military intervention.
Designation as a State sponsor could even provoke a further undesirable
response. As mentioned, North Korean leaders have demonstrated that they
can be thin-skinned when it comes to world opinion.135 But they also possess
a nuclear bomb. Recent chatter in the U.S. political sphere about re-designa-
tion of North Korea as a State sponsor has led North Korea to deny allega-
tions of its support for terrorism but also to "bolster its nuclear deterrent at a
speed baffling to the imagination of the U.S." in response.1 36 It would seem
circular that calling a State a terrorist supporter would induce that State to
support terrorism, especially since their support of terrorism places these
States are on the list in the first place.
Finally, a great concern in leading the development of law, especially
international law, is reciprocity. Any U.S. pronouncements for propriety in
cyberspace could be used against the United States in the future. If North
Korea were to be designated a State sponsor reliant on the Sony hack, how
would the United States apply the principal to other States that are equally, or
more, engaged in activities that could be considered to be cyberterrorism? Is
today's North Korea, tomorrow's China, Russia, Israel, or even the United
States? These scenarios would pose tricky political calculus for the United
States between protecting the interests of both U.S. citizens and companies
while also preserving diplomatic ties with allies and global powers.
In conclusion, the Sony hack-disastrous as it was for the company and
its employees-offers a chance for the United States to make headway in
establishing norms for unacceptable State behavior in cyberspace. Not all
problems can be checked by a strongly worded rebuke, but not all problems
135. Philip Sherwell, North Korea Launches PR Campaign in Response to Damning
UN Report, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asia/northkorea/1 1194279/North-Korea-launches-PR-campaign-in-
response-to-damning-UN-report.html; see Graham Fuller, Mad for the Movies:
On Kim Jon-Il's Insane Obsession With Hollywood (and Elizabeth Taylor),
HUFFINGTON PosT (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/artinfo/
mad-for-the-movies-on-kim b_1162613.html.
136. N. Korea Bashes U.S.' Terrorism-Sponsor List Move, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY
(Nov. 11, 2015, 6:25 PM), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2015/1I1/
12/30/0301000000AEN20151112011000320F.html.
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will warrant a military response. The existing process for designating a State
as a sponsor of terrorism, if justified in this case explicitly upon North Ko-
rea's support for cyberterrorism, is a valid way for the United States to real-
ize a geopolitical benefit, while also opening up the U.S. courts and possible
financial benefit to aggrieved parties, all with very little cost or downside.
